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Learning processes and economic returns  
in European Cohesion policy
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose * and Katja Novak **
ABSTRACT: This paper evaluates whether the learning mechanisms of the Euro-
pean Cohesion policy have contributed to improve the economic impact of Struc-
tural Fund expenditure over time. It analyses whether the evolution of the policy in 
response to greater internal monitoring and external scrutiny has resulted in a more 
efficient and better targeted Cohesion policy. This is tested using an econometric 
model which evaluates the effect of Structural Fund expenditure on the growth of 
regional GDP per capita —conditional on factor endowments, institutional quality 
and initial conditions— during the last programming periods for which full sets of 
data are available (1994-1999 and 2000-2006). The results of the analysis unveil an 
increase in the effectiveness of the policy in successive periods. This positive associ-
ation is robust to controlling for the level of development of the country and the rela-
tive economic position of a region within a country. The results also show that, when 
structural factors are taken into consideration, Structural Fund investment tends to 
yield higher returns in better-off countries and wealthier regions within countries.
JEL Classification: R58; 020.
Keywords: cohesion; regional development; economic growth; GDP per capita; 
regions; European Union.
Procesos de aprendizaje y rendimiento económico de la Política de Cohesión 
Europea
RESUMEN: Este artículo evalúa hasta qué punto los mecanismos de aprendizaje 
de la política de Cohesión europea han contribuido a mejorar el impacto económi-
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co de los Fondos Estructurales. El objetivo es ver si los cambios introducidos en 
la política en respuesta a la evaluación interna y a las críticas externas han dado 
lugar a una política mejor y más eficaz. Para ello se utiliza un método econométri-
co que evalúa el efecto de los Fondos Estructurales sobre el crecimiento regional 
del PIB per cápita —condicionado por la dotación de los factores, la calidad de 
las instituciones y las condiciones iniciales de cada región— durante los dos últi-
mos periodos de programación para los que existen datos completos (1994-1999 y 
2000-2006). Los resultados del análisis indican una mejora de la eficacia de la po-
lítica en el segundo periodo de programación. Esta asociación positiva es robusta a 
la introducción de controles ligados al nivel de desarrollo del país y de la posición 
de cada una de las regiones en el interior del país. Los resultados muestran también 
que, cuando se tienen en cuenta factores estructurales, la inversión en Fondos Es-
tructurales obtiene mejores rendimientos en países con niveles de riqueza más altos 
y en las regiones más ricas en el interior de cada país.
Clasificación JEL: R58; 020.
Palabras clave: cohesión; desarrollo regional; crecimiento económico; PIB per 
cápita; regiones; Unión Europea.
Introduction
«The Union, especially during these difficult times, needs Cohesion Policy» (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2010: III) claim European Commissioners Johannes Hahn and 
László Andor in the very first sentence of the foreword of the Fifth Cohesion Report. 
This view reflects the dominant belief that European Cohesion policy is more than a 
simple redistribution of funds. It is about increasing efficiency in its lagging behind 
regions (Garrido Yserte et al., 2007).
Since the inclusion of the principle of economic and social cohesion in the Single 
European Act, the European Union has indeed made a considerable effort aimed at 
addressing territorial backwardness and attempting to reduce the disparities among 
the regions of EU. From modest origins, the EU Cohesion Policy has grown until 
becoming one of the two most important entries in the European budget. In the fourth 
programming period (2007-2013) E 344 billion euro were earmarked for the Euro-
pean Cohesion effort. This represents approximately 35% of the EU budget (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010: 202); a considerable increase from the 11% of the European 
budget devoted to regional development policy in 1980.
The rising profile and dimension of the European cohesion policy has also brought 
about a greater level of scrutiny. From a pure academic perspective, scholars have in-
creasingly asked the question of whether European Cohesion Policy has delivered its 
stated goals of greater economic, social and territorial cohesion. The results of these 
scholarly analyses vary a great deal depending on the data, estimation methods, time 
periods considered and even the a priori positions held by different researchers. Suc-
cessive reports by the European Commission —without necessarily being uncritical or 
overlooking some of the problems— have highlighted a positive impact of the policy.
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However, a majority of studies by independent researchers have tended to criti-
cize the European Cohesion effort for either not reaching its objectives (e. g. Boldrin 
and Canova, 2001; García-Milá and McGuire, 2001; de Freitas et al., 2003; Dall’erba 
and Le Gallo, 2008b), or for having a limited (e. g. Bussoletti and Esposti, 2004; 
Bouvet, 2005), mixed (e. g. Puigcerver-Peñalver, 2004), or territorially uneven im-
pact (e. g. Antunes and Soukiazis, 2005; Percoco, 2005; Mohl and Hagen, 2010).
The excessive focus on the overall impact of the European Cohesion Policy has 
inevitably led to black or white positions about its effectiveness and, more impor-
tantly, to overlooking other important aspects of the policy, such as the learning ca-
pacity of European development intervention. The question has always been whether 
the European Cohesion effort has delivered and not whether the impact has improved 
over time. Yet one of the key characteristics of European regional development inter-
vention since the reform of the Structural Funds in 1989 has been the constant quest 
to reform and refine the policy instruments. Each successive programming period has 
brought about substantive changes in the policy, addressing what were perceived to be 
the main problems in the previous period or even responding to criticisms from dif-
ferent sources, including academic studies. This makes European Cohesion policy a 
process and not an event, with a significant potential for learning and improvement.
In this paper we address precisely the question of whether the changes and re-
forms adopted in successive programming periods have led to an improvement of the 
effectiveness and impact of European Structural Funds, by looking at the perform-
ance of 133 comparable European regions over the last two completed programming 
periods (1994-1999 and 2000-2006).
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, we take a look at what 
the scholarly literature has said about the impact of the European Cohesion policy, 
in general, and of the Structural Funds, in particular, as a way of framing the impor-
tance of the question, before discussing if and in which way the design and delivery 
of regional development policy has improved over time. The central part of the study 
consists of an econometric analysis of the effectiveness of the Structural Funds. The 
econometric model tries to capture the effects of the Structural Funds on growth in re-
gions during the programming periods between 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. This sec-
tion is followed by the discussion of results, paying special attention to the evidence 
of improvements in achieving policy goals. The final section presents the conclusions 
and some policy considerations. 
1.   Have the Structural Funds delivered? An analysis  
of the literature
There has certainly been no shortage of interest in the EU Cohesion Policy. 
Putting the Structural Funds under the spotlight has, nonetheless, not delivered any 
greater clarity. Different empirical studies have come up with varying results —often 
as a result of the use of different evaluation techniques (Esteban et al., 2009)— con-
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cerning the impact of the Structural Funds on regional economic performance. These 
results range from the positive to the extremely negative 1 and reflect «the difficulties 
in identifying impacts, particularly in isolating Structural Fund effects from other 
macro-economic measures and other noise» (Gripaios et al., 2008: 518).
Perhaps the most positive effects of Structural Funds on regional economic per-
formance have been found by Cappelen et al. (2003), who analyse this interaction 
during the period 1980-1997 for a sample of 105 European regions in nine member 
states. Their results show that «EU regional support through the Structural Funds has 
a significant and positive impact on the growth performance of European regions and, 
hence, contributes to greater equality in productivity and income in Europe» (Cap-
pelen et al., 2003: 640). They uncover a strong association between regional support 
and the endowment of different European regions: the effect of regional support is 
greater in better endowed regions (Cappelen et al., 2003). Bouvet (2005) draws rela-
tively similar conclusions in a study covering the period between 1975 and 1999. Us-
ing data for eight different European countries, she reports that «EU regional policy 
has a positive but modest effect on regional economic growth» (Bouvet, 2005: 17). 
This positive effect is greater on employment and total factor productivity growth 
rates than on the general investment rate (Bouvet, 2005: 17-18).
Analyses targeting specific countries often also find a positive impact of the Eu-
ropean Structural effort. Sosvilla-Rivero (2010), for example, looking at the case of 
the regions with the highest level of Structural Fund support in Spain (Objective 1 
or Convergence regions), remarks that the funds have contributed significantly to 
economic growth and to wealth and employment creation and its influence has been 
felt not only in the regions with the greatest level of assistance, but also in advanced 
regions (Mancha-Navarro and Garrido-Yserte, 2010: 77). Indeed, «EU Cohesion 
Policy would have allowed about a third of the fifteen percentage points that the 
Spanish per capita income has caught up on the EU-15 average over the 1988-2006 
period» (Sosvilla-Rivero and Cuadrado-Roura, 2009: 20). These results are broadly 
in line with those of de la Fuente (2003). Some regional analyses reach similar con-
clusions. In the case of the Spanish region of Castilla-La Mancha, Sosvilla-Rivero 
et al. (2006), conclude that the European Cohesion effort has raised economic per-
formance between 0.64 and 0.38 points, depending on the period considered. Similar 
results can be found in Cancelo et al. (2009) and Cámara and Marcos (2009) for the 
cases of Galicia and Madrid respectively.
The studies reporting a clear-cut positive association between structural spend-
ing and economic growth and regional convergence are, however, in a minority. The 
majority of academic studies tend to give inconclusive or even negative evidence in 
response to the question of whether the European Cohesion policy has succeeded in 
achieving its goals.
Among the studies with inconclusive results Mohl and Hagen (2010), Ederveen 
et al. (2003) and Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) can be highlighted. Mohl and 
1 See Mohl and Hagen (2010) for an overview of the literature on the topic.
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Hagen (2010) analyse the returns of Cohesion policies for 124 regions of EU-15 
during the period 1995-2005 and conclude that the impact of the Structural Funds 
depends very much on the cohesion objective being considered. Regional interven-
tion appears to have had a significant and positive impact only in the poorest re-
gions of the EU-15 —the former Objective 1 or Convergence Regions—. The impact 
for the other objectives is either negative or insignificant. Similarly, Ederveen et al. 
(2003) find mixed evidence of the impact of Structural Funds in European regions 
between 1981 and 1996. In their view, the returns of the Structural Fund investment 
are highly dependent on whether we are looking at absolute convergence, conditional 
convergence with country-specific effects, or conditional convergence with regional-
specific effects. It is only when conditional-convergence with region specific effects 
is considered that cohesion policy has a positive influence on convergence (Ederveen 
et al., 2003: 37).
Finally, Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) show that, while there is a positive, 
albeit marginal, effect of Structural Fund investment on regional growth per capita, 
this effect is fundamentally linked to Structural Fund investment in human capital 
—rather than in transport infrastructure or business support (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Fratesi, 2004: 100).
Even more common are the studies which reach the conclusion that European 
Cohesion policy has completely failed to achieve its goals of reducing the back-
wardness of lagging regions and of addressing the disparities between the levels of 
development of the various regions. Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008a) fail to find any 
statistical significant effect of Structural Funds on regional growth during the period 
1989-1999, while, in a parallel study, they report a small negative effect of some 
Structural Fund expenditure on economic growth which mainly affects Convergence 
or Objective 1 regions (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008b: 339). Further analysis by 
these authors and Rachel Guillain confirms the supposed lack of impact of Euro-
pean Regional Development policies during the period 1989-1999 (Dall’erba et al., 
2009: 92). Other authors have gone even further and claimed that regional and struc-
tural policies in the EU have only served redistributional purposes (e. g. Boldrin and 
Canova 2001, 2003).
The conclusion that can be drawn from this brief overview of the literature on the 
returns of European Cohesion policy is straightforward: there is no clear academic 
consensus on the effectiveness and returns of Structural Funds.
1.1.   Have the EU structural policies improved?
One of the aspects that the majority of these studies have ignored is that the Euro-
pean Cohesion policies are neither monolithical, nor have they remained stable over 
time. Since the introduction of the principle of programming in the 1989 reform of the 
Structural Funds, regional development intervention in the EU is structured around 
a multiannual strategic planning system which permits the constant monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and generates a learning process which helps address any po-
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tential shortcomings in the policy. One of the key instruments in that learning process 
have been the regular reports on economic, social and territorial cohesion (European 
Commission, 1996, 2001a, 2004, 2007, 2010). These reports —commonly known as 
the Cohesion Reports— are published at more or less regular intervals and contain a 
combination of a description of the current regional situation with an evaluation of 
the impact of EU Cohesion policy and of the territorial dimension of other EU and 
national policies. One of the key changes in these reports over time has been, on top 
of their increasing quality, a more and more critical tone towards specific types of in-
tervention associated with the European Cohesion effort. The diagnosis contained in 
successive reports has therefore contributed to refinements and improvements in the 
European Cohesion Policy which may have helped transform its potential impact.
In successive Reports the suggestions for changes and improvements have been 
coming thick and fast. The Third Cohesion Report (European Commission, 2004), 
for example, put the emphasis on reinforcing the priorities of Cohesion policy, in-
cluding strengthening key objectives in the areas of innovation and human capital. It 
also proposed, among other things, an increase in the quality of the strategies in order 
to promote a more balanced and sustainable development effort, as well as positing 
a more limited and better targeted number of key interventions. Other key recom-
mendations included paying greater attention and responding better to specific ter-
ritorial characteristics and adopting a more strategic orientation of intervention to the 
priorities of the EU as a whole (European Commission, 2004; see also Garrido Yserte 
et al., 2007). The Fourth Cohesion Report continued to advise the promotion of a 
new strategic approach with greater earmarking of resources for key interventions, 
as well as better and leaner regulations, including a more efficient management and 
eligibility rules and a simplification of the financial management principles. It also 
suggested a series of new future challenges (European Commission, 2007). The Fifth 
Cohesion Report (European Commission, 2010) recommended enforcing strategic 
planning, increasing, once again, thematic concentration, introducing greater condi-
tionality and clearer delivery assistance centres, as well as improving the evaluation, 
performance and results. In addition it put forward the need to strengthen governance 
and enforce partnerships, while creating a simpler system of delivery and incentives 
(European Commission, 2010).
Parallel to the official EU Reports, independent reports have proposed similar 
improvements to the policy. The best-known of these reports (Barca, 2009) has put 
the emphasis on a greater concentration of resources, on conditionalities, a greater 
attention to the importance of institutions and a better governance system, including 
the promotion of more innovative and experimental expenditures and the encourage-
ment of a learning process.
While internal EU and associated reports have been a rich source of suggestions 
for Cohesion Policy innovation, they are by no means the only one. Independent 
researchers have also looked for the potential causes which may have affected the 
returns of the European Cohesion policy. Crescenzi (2009) has signalled one of the 
core principles of regional policy, the principle of concentration (or lack of it), as a 
one of the culprits of the lack of clear cut returns from intervention. He indicates that 
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the insufficient concentration of Structural Fund expenditure in the most socio-eco-
nomically disadvantaged regions has created a handicap for growth and convergence 
(Crescenzi, 2009: 120). His analysis also reveals that during the two programming 
periods considered there has been a strengthening of the geographical concentra-
tion of intervention, along the lines suggested in successive Cohesion Reports. These 
findings underline the existence of policy learning mechanisms which may be behind 
any potential improvement in the effectiveness of Structural Fund spending.
From a different perspective, Bachtler and Gorzelak (2007) have put forward 
three possible explanations of the relatively limited past returns of Cohesion policies. 
First of all and along the lines of other studies (e. g. Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 
2004; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012), Structural Fund expenditure may have 
been too biased towards infrastructure —and, in particular, transport infrastructure— 
investment. Investment in transport infrastructure may have unleashed forces which 
increased the concentration of economic activity in core at the expense of peripheral 
areas.
The returns of Cohesion policy may also have been undermined by existing busi-
ness support policies (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007: 316). Regional policy has possi-
bly had a distortionary effect on the economy, as it aims to attract innovative activities 
to regions with a low- to middle-skilled labour endowments (Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Overman, 2002). Had regional intervention concentrated on activities more in line 
with the endowments of different territories, as also recommended by successive 
Cohesion Reports, its effectiveness could have been improved. Lastly, the meagre 
returns of European Cohesion Policy could also be a consequence of an inadequate 
regional institutional capacity (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007: 316). Structural Fund 
interventions are likely to be more effective in countries with a higher institutional 
quality and low levels of corruption (Ederveen et al., 2006). This implies that, in line 
with the suggestions of the Barca Report (2009), any improvement in regional institu-
tional capacity would lead to a greater effectiveness of Structural Fund expenditure.
Finally, from a new economic geography perspective point of view, the returns 
of European Cohesion Policy may have been affected by the natural tendency of eco-
nomic activity to agglomerate in space. As «firms and workers prefer to locate near 
markets, and markets are located where firms and workers reside» (Brakman et al., 
2005: 51), regional intervention, regardless of its dimension, will find it difficult to 
offset this process. Indeed, investment in infrastructure may have contributed to rein-
force this circular causation process. Cuadrado-Roura (2010) finds evidence of these 
processes in operation in the Spanish case, as strong investment in transport infra-
structure, while significantly contributing to «the convergence process of all Spanish 
regions towards the European average did not mean also internal convergence» (2010: 
299). Consequently regional support is likely to be most effective when spent on hu-
man capital (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004) or labour (Brakman et al., 2005).
This constant stream of recommendations and policy advice coming both from 
internal and outside sources paint a picture of a cohesion effort that is far from static. 
The European Cohesion Policy is constantly evolving and reforming itself, with the 
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main changes drawing it towards becoming a more integrated and balanced policy, 
with a leaner set of objectives and, at least in theory, a better governance system. 
Yet, despite this constant change, the question of whether successive adaptations and 
modifications to the policy have led to improvements on its effectiveness has at-
tracted relatively little attention. There are few studies —Cappelen et al. (2003) and 
Puigcerver-Peñalver (2004) being the main exceptions— which explicitly try to as-
sess the dynamics of regional policy effectiveness. The focus has been always on its 
overall impact, on simply answering the question of whether the policy delivers or 
not, rather than on whether changes have led to a more or less efficient outcome. In 
this study we aim to address precisely this question: has there been an improvement 
over time in the impact of Structural Fund intervention? Have successive changes and 
the learning process associated to constant monitoring made the European Cohesion 
Policy more effective in promoting economic growth in regions where intervention 
is concentrated? This will be done by analysing whether there has been a significant 
improvement —or lack of it— in the returns of Structural Fund investment in the last 
two completed programming periods (1994-1999 vs. 2000-2006). In addition, we are 
interested in assessing where the Structural Funds have had the greatest impact. The 
underlying hypothesis is that through a process of institutional learning the effective-
ness of Structural Funds interventions is likely to have improved in successive pro-
gramming periods as a consequence of the subtle changes introduced in the design 
and implementation of the policy.
2.   The model
2.1.   Changes in Cohesion policy between the third and second 
programming periods
Have the returns of the European Cohesion policy improved with time? Since the 
introduction of the multiannual financial perspectives in 1989, every change in pro-
gramming period has brought about alterations in the design of the European Cohe-
sion Policy. The periods under study —1994-1999 and 2000-2006— were no excep-
tions. There were several notable differences in policy design between intervention in 
the third programming period (2000-2006) in comparison to the second (1994-1999). 
First of all, there was a significant drive towards the geographical concentration and 
prioritization of types of intervention. The six Objectives of the second programming 
period were reduced to a mere three, following recommendations included in Agenda 
2000. The reduction of Objectives meant a significantly greater targeting of resources 
to the most deprived areas. A further indication of the greater concentration of re-
sources in the third programming period relative to the second was the decrease in the 
share of population covered by regional policy spending. The population covered by 
Objective 1 shrunk to 20 percent of the total population of EU in the third program-
ming period from levels of 25 percent in the previous period. What is more, while the 
funds available for regional policy in EU-15 states increased only marginally, there 
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was a more substantial increase of average per capita support in Objective 1 regions, 
as a consequence of the gradual phasing out of some regions. At the same time, per 
capita support for Objective 2 region declined (Drevet, 2008: 214). The share of 
population affected by the new Objective 2 also declined from 25 to 18 percent of the 
total. Similarly, the number of Community Initiatives was cut from thirteen to three 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 2000: 333-334) and the margin of manoeuvre of the Euro-
pean Commission to support excellence was increased with the introduction of a 4% 
performance reserve which could be spent on the best performing programmes in the 
second half of the programming period (European Commission, 2001a: 153).
Noticeable changes in the nature of investments were also undertaken, especially 
in Objective 1 regions. While investment in infrastructure remained very important, 
the «accent [...] shifted to growth, to competitiveness and job creation [...], to educa-
tion and training [...] and to better distribution of specific social services over cities 
in the region [...]» (Molle, 2007: 233). There was also a reduction of direct transfers 
to individual firms —often deemed to be counterproductive and in contradiction with 
competition policy—.
On the more institutional side, the principle of partnership was strengthened. In 
addition to the traditional stakeholders (Commission, Member State governments 
and social partners), other socio-economic agents were invited to adopt a greater role 
in the design and implementation of the policy programmes. Finally, more emphasis 
was given to the monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions. Us-
ing different indicators quantitative targets were set in order to evaluate the impact of 
the Structural funds expenditure (European commission, 2001a: 149-153).
2.2.   The model
In order to assess whether these policy changes resulted in an improvement of the 
returns of the European Cohesion Policy, bringing it closer to its stated goals, we pro-
pose a neo-classical empirical model. The aim is to analyse the effectiveness of EU 
cohesion intervention, by measuring its impact on regional economic performance, 
while controlling for the initial conditions and factor endowments in the regions, in-
cluding indicators depicting the initial wealth of a region and endowments of human 
capital, innovative capacity, infrastructure and quality of institutions.
The model adopts the following form:
yi,t = α0+ α1lnGDPi,t–1 + α2ln(GDP/nGDP)i,t–1 + α3lnSFi,t–1 + α4lnSFi,t–1.  De-
velopmentt–1 + α5infrastructurei,t + α6educationi,t + α7innovationi,t + α8institu-
tionsi,t–1+ ut,i 
(1)
where (i denotes region and t time)
yi,t  is the dependent variable, measuring the growth rate of 
regional GDP per capita;
lnGDPi,t–1  represents the initial level of regional GDP per capita;
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ln(GDP/nGDP)i,t–1  depicts the ratio of regional to national level of economic 
development;
lnSFi,t–1  represents the per capita Structural Funds payments to a 
region concerned in the previous period;
lnSFi,t–1 x Developmentt–1  is an interaction term of Structural Funds expenditure and 
the level of economic development;
infrastructurei,t  is an indicator of infrastructure endowment in the re-
gion;
educationi,t  is an indicator of the human capital in the region;
innovationi,t  is an indicator of the innovative capacity of the region;
institutionsi,t–1  is an indicator of the quality of institutions at the national 
scale;
ut,i  represents the error term.
The rationale for the inclusion of each of the variables in the model is as fol-
lows:
—  Growth rate of regional GDP per capita: The growth rate of regional GDP is 
the most standard measure of regional economic performance.
—  Level of regional GDP per capita: The level of regional GDP per capita is 
used as a proxy for regional wealth. In the model the variable is lagged by one 
period, as our interest lies in the effect of initial wealth on regional economic 
performance. The inclusion of the lagged level of regional GDP per capita 
allows us to test for conditional convergence or divergence across regions. As 
is customary in the literature and in order to address possible issues of non-
linearity, the variable is entered in the model using logarithms.
—  Level of national GDP per capita: The level of national GDP per capita rep-
resents a measure of the relative wealth of a country. It is used in order to 
determine whether the returns of Structural Funds intervention in a particular 
region are conditioned by the wealth of the country. For this reason the natu-
ral logarithm of national GDP per capita is used in interaction with the level 
of per capita Structural Funds expenditure in any given region.
—  Ratio of regional to national GDP per capita: Regional economic perform-
ance tends to be highly correlated with the performance of neighbouring re-
gions, as a consequence of the presence of strong trade and other type of 
linkages. We therefore use a ratio of regional to national economic develop-
ment as a proxy in order to capture spatial interdependencies within coun-
tries. Even though this indicator only takes into account interactions among 
regions in the same country, it does lead to a significant reduction of potential 
spatial autocorrelation problems. Regions in the same country are generally 
much more interdependent between one another than neighbouring regions 
separated by national borders (Armstrong, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). In-
direct barriers to trade, national regulatory frameworks and national tax and 
welfare systems ensure that this remains the case.
  This variable is included in the model in two different ways. Firstly, as an in-
dependent variable; secondly, in interaction with per capita Structural Funds 
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expenditure in a given region, as a way to measure the difference in effective-
ness of Structural Funds depending on the relative level of economic develop-
ment of a region in comparison with the country average.
—  Structural Funds payments per capita: EU regional policy intervention in 
a region is measured by the actual Structural Funds payments to regions. 
As a general rule, only payments to former Objective 1 (promoting the de-
velopment and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lag-
ging behind), Objective 2 (converting regions seriously affected by indus-
trial decline), Objective 5b (facilitating the rural development and structural 
adjustment of rural areas) and Objective 6 (promoting the development of 
regions with an extremely low population density) are included —these are 
the payments within the Cohesion policy which can be considered as direct 
territorial interventions—. The data for Structural Funds payments to a par-
ticular region was provided by the European Commission. In order to obtain 
a comparable indicator —Structural Funds per capita— the payments were 
divided by the total population. As a way to assess the medium- rather than 
the short-run, Keynesian, effect of the Cohesion policy, the regional aid to the 
region from the previous period is included in the model (as a means to cap-
ture the supply and not the demand side effect of expenditure). The variable 
is included in the model in logarithms.
—  Level of human capital: The educational attainment of the population is used 
as the proxy for the human capital endowment of a region. The exact indicator 
is the percentage of adults (25-64) who have completed tertiary education.
—  Innovative capacity: We resort to the percentage of private research and de-
velopment (R&D) expenditure in total regional GDP as our measure of in-
novative capacity. R&D expenditure measures input into innovative activities 
in each region. The innovation capacity of a region is generally considered as 
«one of the key factors behind long-run interregional differences in produc-
tivity and income» (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2008: 69). However, for 
the purpose the model, we only consider private R&D expenditure, as a more 
genuine indicator than overall R&D expenditure of the regional innovation 
potential. This is because public investment may frequently serve purposes 
already linked to regional development other than simply aiming to generate 
innovation. It is often the case that public R&D is used as a way to improve 
the performance of regions lagging behind.
—  Infrastructure endowment: We use the kilometres of motorway per square kil-
ometre in any given region as our measure of infrastructure. Although this is 
one in a number of indicators which may represent regional infrastructure en-
dowment, regional data availability constrains imply that this is one of two po-
tential infrastructure proxies which could be used (the other being railways) 2.
2 It has to be borne in mind that the use of such an infrastructure indicator introduces a series of 
biases. The main bias is that it tends to favour regions where the investment has taken place, but which do 
not necessarily benefit to the same extent from the investment, as the resulting motorways may connect 
more important poles outside the region.
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—  Quality of institutions at the national level: Institutions matter enormously 
for economic performance, but at a regional level in Europe there are virtu-
ally no indicators which measure the quality of institutions in a comparative 
way. Hence, due to the lack of adequate institutional data at the regional 
level, we are forced —despite its shortcomings— to resort to national indi-
cators, assuming that regional institutions do not vary significantly within 
countries or, at least, that international variation is substantially greater 
than intranational variation. We use the Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International as our proxy for the quality of institutions in 
a particular country. The corruption perception index is a composite in-
dex based on more than ten surveys of business people and assessments 
of country analysts (Transparency International, 2008). The index varies 
between zero and ten, where zero denotes the most corrupt country and ten 
a corruption free country. The use of a country index can be justified by the 
fact that Structural Funds money is transferred from the EU through the 
national to the regional level. The Corruption index does not vary a great 
deal over time.
2.3.   Estimation method
In order to test whether policy learning has occurred and, consequently, the 
returns of Structural Fund investment across the regions of the EU have increased 
between the second and third programming periods, we run Model (1) using a 
heteroscedasticity-robust fixed effects panel data estimation. The time periods 
covered correspond to the comparison between the two latest completed Cohesion 
Policy programming periods (1994-1999 and 2000-2006). This allows us to check 
whether the effect on growth of European structural expenditure varied between 
the  periods.
The key independent variable of interest is the level of expenditure per capita 
of Structural Funds in each region of the EU15 for which complete sets of regional 
data are available for each programming period. In addition, we combine the variable 
of interest with an indicator of the level of economic development of the country a 
region belongs to (country’s GDP per capita) or of the relative position of the region 
within a given country (ratio of regional to national GDP per capita). The aim of the 
use of this combination between Structural Fund expenditure and the level of devel-
opment is to assess whether the returns of the Cohesion effort are affected by the level 
of development of the country or the region where the effort takes place. This leads to 
the estimation of two variations of Model (1), including in each one the country and 
the regional development interaction.
The relatively high volatility of both annual Structural Funds expenditure and 
regional GDP per capita growth may seriously affect the results. Hence, in order to 
minimize the impact of year-on-year volatility, we use three-year moving averages 
for all the variables included in the analysis. The use of the moving averages has also 
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the advantage of further reducing the problem of capturing a short-run demand effect 
of regional aid expenditure, as the average regional growth rates of GDP per capita 
during a period of three years are regressed on the average Structural Funds expendi-
ture, level of development and indicator of the quality of institutions of the previous 
three year period, as well as on other control variables during the same period.
Given the need to make the regional sample perfectly comparable across period, 
only regions belonging to countries which joined the EU before 2004 and which were 
eligible for Structural Fund support during both programming periods are included 
in the analysis.
The regional sample comprises fundamentally NUTS2 3 regions, although in 
some cases —and as a way to compare regions that are «reasonably large» in popula-
tion size and «reasonably heterogeneous» in factor endowment» (Boldrin and Cano-
va, 2001: 212)— the larger NUTS1 regions are used in a limited number of cases, 
namely Belgium, Germany 4 and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, due to the lack 
of regional data, Denmark, Luxembourg and Ireland are excluded from the analysis. 
The regional sample includes a total of 133 regions 5.
3.   Analysis of results
Table 1 reports the results of estimating the models presented in the previous 
section. The table is divided into two sections. The three columns on the left hand 
side (regressions 1 to 3) present the results for the second programming period (1994-
1999), while the results for the third programming period (2000-2006) are included 
in the three columns to the right (regressions 4 to 6).
The key result emerging from the estimation of the model for the second pro-
gramming period (1994-1999) is the lack of association between regional structural 
funding expenditure and regional per capita economic growth, once factor endow-
ments, initial conditions, and institutional quality are controlled for (Table 1, regres-
sions 1, 2 and 3). None of the coefficients considering Structural Fund expenditure 
during the period 1994-1999 is significant. This applies when the Structural Funds 
expenditure is considered on its own (regression 1), as well as in combination with 
the level of wealth of a country (regression 2) or with the level of development of the 
region within a country (regression 3). The level of economic growth during this pe-
riod is much more related to the initial wealth of a given region, its wealth relative to 
the rest of the country, its infrastructural endowment, its level of human capital, and 
3 Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units level 2.
4 The analysis does not include the East German regions of Berlin DE3, Brandenburg DE4, Meck-
lenburg-Vorpommern DE8, Sachsen DED, Sachsen-Anhalt DEE and Thüringen DEG.
5 Due to data limitations the Italian regions of Provincia autonoma di Bolzano ITD1, Provincia 
autonoma di Trento ITD2 and the Finish regions of Länsi Suomi FI19 and Åland FI20 are excluded from 
the analysis. Several ultraperipheral islands and exclaves are also excluded: Região Autónoma dos Açores 
PT20, Região Autónoma da Madeira PT30, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta ES63, Ciudad Autónoma de Me-
lilla ES64, Canarias ES70, and Départments d’Outre-Mer FR9.
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the quality of its institutions (the level of corruption) (Table 1, regressions 1, 2 and 
3). During this programming period, the negative and statistically significant coef-
ficient on initial wealth points towards the existence of regional convergence across 
the EU. This convergence is reinforced by a weak, but nevertheless significant, level 
of within-country convergence. Institutions also matter. Lower levels of corruption 
are associated with higher levels of growth, once other factors are controlled for (Ta-
ble 1). Human capital endowment is, as expected, positively associated to GDP per 
capita growth, while infrastructure —in line with studies by Vanhoudt et al. (2000), 
for a similar time period— has a negative and strongly significant association with 
economic performance. The level of innovation is the only control variable that is not 
significant.
These results are in line with much of the literature on the returns of structural 
policy intervention in the EU during the second programming period (e. g. Rodrígu-
ez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008a; Esposti and Bussoletti, 
2008), which tend to find either a very limited —or, in some cases, no influence 
whatsoever— of Structural Fund expenditure on regional growth performance across 
the EU. These results reinforce the idea that the 1989 reform of the Structural Funds, 
despite considerable improvements with respect to the pre-reform intervention, did 
not suffice on its own to bring the desired outcomes in terms of greater economic 
returns.
The results for the third programming period are in radical contrast with respect 
to the previous one. Between 2000 and 2006, Structural Fund expenditure had an 
impact on subsequent regional economic growth. The coefficient for the lagged struc-
tural fund expenditure per capita variable is positive and significant at the 5% level 
(Table 1, regression 4). However, this positive effect is uneven according to the level 
of wealth of a country where the funds are being spent and to the relative level of 
development of the region within the country. The returns of investment in cohesion 
tend to be greater, once other factors are controlled for, the wealthier the country 
(regression 5). They are also higher in better-off relative to worse-off regions within 
a country (regression 6). These changes in the sign and significance of the structural 
fund coefficients have a certain influence on the coefficients for all the other variables 
included in the model. First of all, they affect the level of within country convergence. 
While at the European level we still observe a degree of cross-country convergence, 
the limited within country convergence of the previous programming period disap-
pears and is replaced by some level of divergence, which is only significant once the 
interaction between structural fund expenditure and the level of the development of 
the country is taken into account (Table 1, regression 5).
Another important change is related to the association between infrastructure 
endowment and growth. Our proxy for infrastructure endowment, which had a nega-
tive and significant relationship with economic growth in the previous programming 
period, becomes positive, albeit not significant, during the third programming period. 
By contrast, the impact of human capital is greatly enhanced. In line with similar 
studies (e. g. Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Brakman et al., 2005; Rodríguez-
Pose and Crescenzi, 2008), human capital emerges as the basic ingredient behind 
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European regional economic growth. The dimension of the impact of human capital 
on regional growth may also contribute to determine the lack of significance of our 
proxy of innovation. A decent endowment in human capital may determine the ability 
of any territory to generate and assimilate technology. Hence, greater investment in 
R&D may only yield significant returns in combination with a good level of human 
capital. In many lagging areas human capital shortages may therefore limit the poten-
tial returns of policies and actions aimed at improving the innovative capacity, mak-
ing «the local social-economic conditions [...] a better predictor of economic growth 
that investment in R&D» (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008: 60).
4.   Conclusions and policy considerations
The analysis has been aimed at testing whether successive changes in how Eu-
ropean Cohesion policy has been implemented across regions of Europe have led to 
improvements in the impact of Structural Fund expenditure on economic growth. 
The results presented in the previous subsection indicate that this has been the case: 
notwithstanding an increase in the management errors in the application of Structural 
Funds (Moreno Enguix et al., 2012), there has been a marked improvement in the 
returns of investment in Structural Funds between the second and third program-
ming periods. The constant scrutiny and feedback which are at the heart of the policy 
making process since the 1989 reform of the Structural Funds has created a learn-
ing process which, no doubt, has contributed to an improvement in the effectiveness 
of intervention. Internal introspection and external scrutiny have brought about a 
constant trickle of changes, such as a continuous constant drive towards reinforcing 
priorities, a greater emphasis over the years on human capital and innovation, often 
at the expense of infrastructure investment, a persistent push towards increasing the 
quality of the design and the delivery of policy, greater attention to local, place-based, 
conditions, and a strengthening of the system of governance and policy, which are 
possibly at the root of the increasing returns of the policy with time. The growing 
concentration of funds in areas with the greatest level of disadvantage may have 
brought the level of investment over the threshold where significant differences can 
be made (Garrido Yserte et al. 2007). Learning processes may have also resulted 
in a more appropriate expenditure of the Cohesion funds, due to a progressive shift 
in their expenditure priorities. The gradual move from direct support of firms and 
transport infrastructure —which yielded limited returns in previous programming 
periods (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004)— towards other forms of infrastructure 
and human resources (European Commission, 2001b: 56) may have also contributed 
to this greater effectiveness.
The strengthening of the principle of partnership is another potential factor be-
hind improvements over time. Partnership implies a greater involvement in the proc-
ess by local and regional administrations and this requires a learning process. It might 
just be the case that, under a more decentralised framework for the implementation of 
European cohesion policy, regional and local administrations may have taken some 
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time to adapt to the new requirements endorsed in the 1989 reform of the Structural 
Funds (Molle, 2007: 194-196). Gradual improvements in the capacity of local and 
regional administrations are certain to have led to a better implementation and man-
agement of the policy and to the higher returns observed on the third programming 
period relative to the second. A process of institutional learning at capacity building 
linked to the European cohesion effort will have contributed to a more efficient use of 
the available funds. A final explanation of the greater effectiveness of the effort may 
be a greater emphasis on results and the improvements in the monitoring of expendi-
ture in successive programming periods.
However, not all the results point in the direction that the learning processes as-
sociated to the implementation of the European cohesion policy have yielded greater 
returns. The European territorial development effort still works better —once other 
factors are controlled for— in richer than in poorer countries and in wealthy, rather 
than in lagging regions within countries. This result, to a certain extent, could be ex-
pected. Concentrations of knowledge and human capital and the greater accessibility 
of agglomerated areas is likely to generate increasing returns to scale which would 
favour advanced areas to the detriment of lagging ones. Because core areas have 
got greater comparative advantages, the returns of cohesion investment are likely to 
be greater in richer states and better off regions than in lagging areas. However, the 
increasing concentration of intervention in those regions with the greatest need may 
be a force that would counterbalance this tendency in the medium term. In any case, 
as pointed out by Begg (2008), European Cohesion policy is likely to have a hard 
time in trying to achieve simultaneously greater cohesion and better overall eco-
nomic performance, by improving the innovative capacity and performance of lag-
ging areas through the implementation of the Lisbon and the Europe 2020 agendas. 
As Begg underlines, «there is a danger that too great a “Lisbonisation” of Cohesion 
policy will result in inappropriate policy choices, and may also undermine equity 
considerations» (Begg, 2008: 7). All in all, a European regional policy more focused 
on Lisbon objectives can have a positive effect on improving overall competitive-
ness of the EU. However, it is unclear whether, at the same time, it can contribute to 
its stated goal of achieving greater economic, social and territorial cohesion across 
European regions.
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